In a brief passage, David Lewis derives from quantum-theory a dilemma regarding the explanation of chance events which he tries to solve by first distinguishing plain from contrastive why-questions, and then arguing that with respect to chance events, only plain why-questions have answers. His brevity warrants elaboration and critique. I endorse his derivation, but I make a structural objection to his solution. Once a further distinction is drawn between different kinds of contrastive why-question, his solution can be modified and refined so as to go some way to meeting this objection. However, it cannot resist a deeper objection to the effect that chance events can be given contrastive explanations after all. The alternative solution to the dilemma that I recommend holds Lewis's conception of the "essence of chance" to be illusory.
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Lewis's dilemma and his solution 1.Lewis's dilemma
On a number of occasions, Lewis (1986) suggests that chance is all-pervasive:
All-Pervasiveness of Chance
If current scientific theory is to be trusted, chance events are far from exceptional. The misguided hope that determinism might prevail in history if not in physics well deserves … mockery (Lewis 1986d, p. 230 , footnote) … [Chance] processes are pervasive. So much so that not only is the world as a whole indeterministic, but also it can contain few if any deterministic enclaves (Lewis 1986b, p. 59 ) … our world is chancy; and chancy enough so that most things that happen had some chance … of not happening. (Lewis 1986a, p. 175) Yet he observes that the all-pervasiveness of chance gives rise to a dilemma:
The Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism
On the one hand, we seem quite prepared to offer explanations of chance events. Those of us who think that chance is all-pervasive are no less willing than the staunchest determinist to explain the events that chance to happen. On the other hand, we balk at the very idea of explaining why a chance event took place-for is it not the very essence of chance that one thing happens rather than another for no reason whatsoever? Are we of two minds? (Lewis 1986d, p. 230) 
Indeterminism and chance
Lewis's characterisation of this dilemma and its origin reflects his theses (i) that chance is an objective feature "attaching in the first instance to propositions: the chance of an event, an outcome, etc. … [being] … the chance of truth of the proposition that holds at just those worlds where that event, outcome, or whatnot occurs" (Lewis 1980, p.91) ; and (ii) that chance is incompatible with determinism.
1 Neither thesis is uncontroversial. The first is rejected both by subjectivists who reject objective chance and by frequentists who deny that (objective) chance is a feature of the "single-case" of a particular event. The second is rejected by those who maintain that (objective) single-case chance is compatible with determinism. However, neither thesis is presupposed by the dilemma. The problem with which Lewis is concerned arises as soon as events abound that are "indeterministic" in being governed by probabilistic laws but not by a system of deterministic laws.
2 Accordingly, to achieve full generality, "chance event" in Lewis's formulation should be read weakly as "indeterministic event". On this reading, the dilemma skirts the issue of whether single-case objective chances are compatible with determinism and loses none of its force on subjectivist or otherwise non-Lewisian conceptions of probabilistic laws.
Lewis's solution
Lewis maintains that the key to solving the dilemma is a distinction between two kinds of why-question: "plain" why-questions of the form "Why did E occur?" and "contrastive" why-questions of the form "Why did E occur rather than E*?". Answers to such questions yield different kinds of explanation-plain and contrastive. In the case of chance events, however, Lewis contends that only one kind of explanation can be given:
Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation
We are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one outcome rather than another … we are right to call chance events inexplicable, if it is contrastive explanation that we have in mind … [In the case of chance events a] contrastive why-question … can have no positive answer … But take away the "rather" … and explanation becomes possible. (Lewis 1986d, pp. 230-1) For Lewis, plain explanations of chance events are possible, but contrastive explanations of them are not. It is this asymmetry which he offers as a solution to the dilemma.
Historical background
Lewis presents and addresses the dilemma and his solution in a flash, and without references or background the depth of his analysis can be lost. In fact, together they reflect much of the controversy which arose among theorists of explanation in the seventies as indeterminism-as opposed to mere statistical law-came to the fore. Respectively, the dilemma's horns reflect the sympathies of those such as Stegmüller (1973) , who denied the possibility of explaining indeterministic events (second horn), 3 and those such as Jeffrey (1969) and Railton (1978) who insisted that (all) chance events can be explained (first horn). Moreover, Lewis's solution is a compromise which sees truth on both sides and attempts to reconcile at least some of the considerations which pulled the community of theorists asunder. In itself, the compromise was not original. But whereas Mellor (1976) implements it with respect to chance events by echoing Hempel's inductive-statistical version of the covering-law model and distinguishing chance events that have explanations (the probable ones) from those which have not (the improbable ones), Lewis implements it with respect to explanations: all chance events are alike in having explanations of one kind (plain) while lacking those of another kind (contrastive). Others embraced a similar asymmetry around the same time (e.g. Railton 1981 , Salmon 1984 , but Lewis seems to have developed the first substantial argument for it (see §5.3 below), and no one else managed to distill so much of the controversy into so little.
Why the dilemma arises
Lewis's dilemma is neat, powerful, and fertile-if chance is all-pervasive. I agree with him that in the relevant respect it is: chance exists in the micro realm, and micro chance seeps up so as to pervade macro levels ( §2.1). But it will prove important for what follows to be more specific than Lewis regarding the ways in which an event can be chancy ( §2.2).
From micro to macro chance
Though indeterminism at the micro level is not uncontroversial, it is a reasonable working hypothesis. Hence, at least when "chance" is construed neutrally as I have proposed, so too is the thesis that many micro processes are chancy. As Lewis puts the point:
Micro Chance
[The] laws of nature that govern our world really are indeterministic … there are chance processes involved in radioactive decay, in the making and breaking of chemical bonds, in ionization, in the radiation of light and heat, and so on. (Lewis 1986b, p. 59; cf. Lewis 1986c, p. 118) Moreover, micro chance generates chance at the macro level via at least three routes. Firstly, as Lewis (1986c, p. 119) observes, the macro outcome of a process such as the toss of a coin can depend on micro events that are internal to the process:
[T]here is chance … in the processes by which the coin leaves the fingers; in the processes whereby [the coin] bounces off air molecules and sends them recoiling off, perhaps to knock other molecules into its path; in the process whereby the coin does or doesn't stretch a bit as it spins, thereby affecting its moment of inertia, and in the processes whereby it settles down after first touching the table.
Secondly, the macro outcome of a process can be chancy in virtue of being sensitive to chancy events that are external to the process (Lewis 1986c, p. 118) . For example, the outcome of a coin toss might be affected by meltdown at a nearby power station. Thirdly, the macro outcome of a process might be chancy because of the chanciness of certain micro events, namely, the continuing stability of constituent unstable atoms, which in part constitute the process, that are not naturally classified as either internal or external. Consider the event of Arafat and Rabin (first) shaking hands. This event was chancy because there was some chance of an (explosive!) event which would have prevented it: namely, the spontaneous near-simultaneous decay of all the Carbon-14 nuclei contained in their bodies sometime beforehand. Given the prevalence near the surface of the earth of naturally occurring unstable nuclei, this third consideration kicks in where the other two leave off so as to ensure that chance pervades the realm of macro events too. 4 4 While Lewis notes the first and second routes to macro chanciness, his approval (1981, p. 230 , footnote) of a remark by Peter Railton (1978) regarding the susceptibility of social revolutions to massively explosive spontaneous decay of naturally occurring unstable nuclei obscures the distinction between the second route and the third. This may be connected to his neglect of the distinction I am about to make between weak and strong chanciness.
Two notions of "chance" event
As Lewis (1980, p. 91 ) observes, chance is temporally relative: at different times beforehand, an event which in fact occurs later can have different chances of not occurring. This relativity gives rise to importantly different senses in which an event can be chancy per se which he does not distinguish. Let E be an event such that there are times prior to its occurrence (if it is actual) or non-occurrence (if it is non actual). Then E is "strongly" chancy iff either (i) E is actual and at every time prior to its occurrence it has some chance of not occurring, or (ii) E is non-actual and at every time prior to its non-occurrence it has some chance of occurring while E is "weakly" chancy iff either (i) E is actual and there is some time prior to its occurrence at which it has some chance of not occurring, or (ii) E is non-actual and there is some time prior to its non-occurrence at which it has some chance of occurring. Accordingly, there are two versions of All-Pervasiveness of Chance depending on whether it is strong or weak chance that is at issue. Lewis himself does not distinguish them, and restoration of an excision from the doctrine is not decisive as to the correct interpretation:
[O]ur world is chancy; and chancy enough so that most things that happen had some chance immediately beforehand of not happening. (Lewis 1986a, p. 175, my italics) . I doubt that Lewis is speaking literally. If time is dense there is no "immediately beforehand", and I do not think that Lewis denies that time is dense. But a non-literal interpretation is ambiguous between weak and strong chance. Weak chance comes in degrees: among actual events that are merely weakly chancy, one which is no longer chancy long before it occurs is very weakly chancy, whereas one which remains chancy at times shortly prior to its occurrence is nearly strongly chancy. In maintaining that chance is all-pervasive, Lewis might be claiming that most events are strongly chancy, or he might be claiming that most events are at least nearly strongly chancy. However, since Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation holds that differences of principle hinge on whether or not an event is chancy, and since Lewis appears to invoke strong chance in an argument for the claim that chance events have no contrastive explanation (see §5.3 below), I construe him as maintaining that it is strong chance that is all-pervasive.
Thus construed, Lewis's doctrine of All-Pervasiveness of Chance can still be upheld. Admittedly, the sensitivity of the macro outcome of a pro-cess to chance micro events that are either internal or external to it tends to render that outcome only weakly chancy. For example, as far as the micro events which are internal to the coin tossing process are concerned, by the times of the last flutters of a coin which in fact lands heads, there will no longer be a chance of its not landing heads. And likewise in the case of external influences. For example, suppose that Jones is sitting at the table, and that at t-δ, as the coin is settling on the table's surface, the outcome "heads" remains chancy because there is still some chance that Jones will jolt the table during a tiny interval [t, t+ε] . 5 Jones's intervention would take time to propagate: if he moves at t, his action has no effect upon the coin until t+s. Hence, assuming that time is dense, for some r there is a time t+r at which Jones has not acted, and the coin has not landed heads, such that t+r+s is a time at which the coin has landed heads. And since at t+r Jones can no longer influence the outcome of the toss, as far as this kind of external influence is concerned, there is a time prior to the coin's having landed heads at which its doing so is no longer chancy.
However, the third route from micro to macro chance does generate strong chanciness at the macro level. A process might be chancy even though its outcome is only weakly chancy; namely, by having deterministic sub-processes kicking in towards the end. But radioactive decay does not have temporal sub-processes. It is instantaneous, in the sense that (i) for every instant each atom is in the decayed state or it is not, and (ii) there is nothing that an atom in an undecayed state has to do beforehand in order to get into the decayed state later. (By contrast, e.g. winning a tennis match is not instantaneous in this sense: even if, mutatis mutandis, (i) holds for it, (ii) does not.) Hence, the event of an unstable atom's decay is strongly chancy. Hence, so too is the spontaneous decay, during some very tiny interval [t, t+ε] , of all unstable nuclei. This macro event is the ultimate interferer: occurring sometime beforehand, it could have prevented the occurrence of any positive actual macro event. It thus ensures that such events are weakly-indeed, nearly strongly-chancy. Moreover, its chanciness renders strongly chancy any positive actual event involving macro objects that are composed of significant numbers of unstable nuclei. Consider again the event of Arafat and Rabin (first) shaking hands. Take an instant t at which they have not yet shaken hands that is arbitrarily close to the times at which they have shaken hands. At t there is a chance that the Carbon-14 nuclei partly composing their bodies will decay during a tiny interval [t, t+δ] . Provided δ is sufficiently small, this eventuality would have prevented them from shaking hands. (Indeed, it would have levelled their surroundings.) Since t is arbitrarily close to times at which they have shaken hands, and at it there remains a chance that they won't shake hands, their shaking hands is strongly chancy.
This route to strong chanciness stops short of positive actual events involving macro objects none of which contain unstable nuclei in such numbers and densities as to render their explosive spontaneous decay physically possible. It also stops short at most negative actual eventscorrelatively, at most non-actual positive events-too. Consider the event of Arafat and Begin not shaking hands on January 1, 1974 (GMT). This negative event was probably weakly chancy: the causal histories of human actions are so diverse that some nomologically possible sequence of events starting off from some point in the temporal evolution of the actual world might well involve Arafat and Begin shaking hands on that day. But not even the strong chanciness of spontaneous explosive decay can make this event strongly chancy. As that day was about to close, Begin and Arafat's actual locations were such that their shaking hands on that day was no longer physically possible.
The first of these stopping points does not prevent the Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism from arising. The second will prove important when, in §4.2, I consider whether Lewis's solution can be modified so as to meet the objection to it I am about to raise. Lewis's solution 
A structural objection to

Dilemma and Solution made explicit
To consider whether Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation solves The Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism let us spell out the latter's horns more fully. Assume All-Pervasiveness of Chance. Then, in particular, chance engages the macro level too, and First horn: Chance events cannot be supposed inexplicable: that would require an unacceptable retraction of our explanations of macro events.
Yet we sense a conceptual connection between chance and inexplicability, so Second horn: Chance events cannot be supposed explicable: that would require an unacceptable revision of our conception of the "essence of chance" whereby there is no reason why a chance event happens rather than some other. According to Lewis, the dilemma has two readings depending on whether its horns concern plain or contrastive explanation. By Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation, on the plain reading the dilemma's first horn is correct, its second horn incorrect; on the contrastive reading its first horn is incorrect, its second horn correct. We are not of two minds. The dilemma equivocates.
Objection
To see that this won't do, focus on Lewis's response to the first horn, and on the contrastive reading of this horn in particular:
First horn, contrastive reading: Chance events cannot be supposed contrastively inexplicable: that would require an unacceptable retraction of our contrastive explanations of macro events. In denying that chance events have contrastive explanations, Lewis's response is swift: the claim made in this horn is false. But this response is inadequate. Prior to his distinction between plain and contrastive explanation, the force of the first horn was precisely that it would be a bad thing to have to relinquish our explanations of macro events. Lewis's response is to say: yes, it would be, but don't worry, you don't have to relinquish them, since chance events are plainly explicable. This response would be fine if our explanatory practice with respect to macro events were confined to plain explanation. But it isn't. We claim to know why England won the World Cup in 1966 rather than 1962 (they had a better team that year), why NATO intervened in the Yugoslavian Civil War rather than the Rwandan Civil War (Central Africa is not one of the West's vital interests), why the thunder was heard after the lightning instead of before it (light travels faster than sound) etc. So Lewis's response is no solution at all. While it deals with the threat the dilemma poses to something we valueplain explanations of macro events-without compromising (what Lewis takes to be) the essence of chance, 6 it does nothing to protect something else we value-contrastive explanations of macro events.
Against error-theory
The most straightforward retort to this objection is to maintain that it is uncharitable to accuse Lewis of failing to defend the indefensible: the fact is that All-Pervasiveness of Chance has the upshot that our contrastive explanations of macro events are misguided. To be sure, contrastive explanation of macro events is central to our lives. Indeed, as if to illus-trate the point, in the very same paper in which he derives the dilemma and offers his solution, Lewis (1986d, p. 230) Yet classification, prediction, and explanation involving the terminology of witchcraft was once a fundamental cognitive practice too, and we pride ourselves on having abandoned it. Why should our contrastive explanatory practice be any different? Whatever the psychological difficulty of giving it up and adopting new ways, the gain-avoidance of false beliefis considerable. Moreover, instead of abandoning it altogether we might insure ourselves against unforeseen losses by maintaining it as a convenient fiction. It can be beneficial to retain a practice believed to involve incorrect judgements-to pretend that there are moral properties when we believe that there are none, to pretend that help is at hand when we believe that it is not etc. Likewise, it might be convenient to maintain the fiction that macro events have contrastive explanations when believing they do not. Lewis holds that events that fall under deterministic laws can be contrastively explained (see §5.3 below). Might he not hold that it is convenient to pretend that macro events are governed by such laws? He is certainly aware of the possibility, and in recent conversation he suggested that his solution might pursue this manoeuvre so as to meet my objection.
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The main problem with eliminativism or fictionalism of this ilk is that it is founded on false analogies, both at the level of what we are being asked to repudiate and at the level of reasons for so doing. Contrastive explana-tion is disanalogous to belief in witchcraft. Whereas ceasing to believe in witchcraft involves giving up one kind of explanation so as to make room for another, holding all contrastive explanations of (chancy) macro events per se false does more than deprive us of an understanding that we thought we had. It is to insist that nothing can fill the void that is left. This leaves us worse off, since a world in which there is no explanation why Lewis visited Melbourne in 1979 rather than Oxford or Uppsala or Wellington is a world that is less intelligible, and more alienating, than we thought.
Furthermore, the justification on offer for error-theory about contrastive explanation of macro events is different in kind from the sort of ground which led to the abandonment of witchcraft. The reasons for which macro contrastive explanations are being deemed erroneous are not straightforwardly empirical. To insist that contrastive explanations of macro events are wrong under All-Pervasiveness of Chance is simply to build a presupposition of determinism into our contrastive explanatory practice. But we should be wary of this move. Indeed, prior to tackling the threat All-Pervasiveness of Chance poses to a closely related cognitive practice-causal judgement-Lewis himself defends the principle at issue. Not only does he go out of his way to reconcile our pre-reflective causal claims with indeterminism, he also writes:
Events that happen by chance may nevertheless be caused. Indeed, it seems likely that most actual causation is of just this sort. Whether that is so or not, plenty of people do think that our world is chancy; and chancy enough so that most things that happen had some chance, immediately beforehand, of not happening. These people are seldom observed to deny commonplace causal statements, except perhaps when they philosophise. An analysis that imputes widespread error is prima facie implausible. (Lewis 1986a, p. 175, my italics) Quite so. But if widespread error should not be imputed with respect to causal claims, it should not be imputed with respect to explanatory claims either. Lewis continues:
Moreover, it is dishonest to accept [an analysis that imputes widespread error], if you yourself persist in the "error" when you leave the philosophy room.
But fictionalism about contrastive explanation would be no less dishonest than fictionalism about causal judgement. Prima facie, it is a bad thing to build a presupposition of determinism into any fundamental cognitive practice; we should at least try to solve our dilemmas without doing so.
Lewis's solution modified and refined
The strategy
In failing to address the implicit claim in the dilemma's first horn that giving up our contrastive explanations of macro events would be unacceptable, Lewis's solution begs the question. Since neither eliminativism nor fictionalism about our contrastive explanatory practice address this claim satisfactorily, Lewis's solution should be rejected. However, to reject it need not be to reject his basic idea. This idea is to concede that the strong chanciness of an event precludes a certain kind of explanation (in accordance with the second horn), but to insist that it does not preclude all explanations (in an attempt to respect the first horn). Asymmetry of Chance Events implements this idea by denying that chance events have contrastive explanations and holding that they have plain explanations. But another way of implementing it retains the claim about plain explanation while weakening the stance on contrastive explanation. Lewis (1986d, p. 230-1) 
says explicitly that
We are right to call chance events inexplicable, if it is contrastive explanation that we have in mind … A contrastive why-question [concerning a chance event] … can have no positive answer … But take away the "rather" … and explanation becomes possible.
But perhaps this condemnation is too sweeping. There are different kinds of contrastive why-question, and different kinds of answer to them. So there are different kinds of contrastive explanation. Even if macro events are strongly chancy, perhaps the sort of contrastive explanation which strong chanciness precludes is different in kind from the sort customarily given in the macro realm. The strategy, then, is to try to salvage Lewis's basic idea by seeking a pertinent contrast among contrastive explanations.
Contrasting contrastive explanations
Following Peter Lipton (1990) , let us say that in a question "Why E rather than E*?", E is the "fact" and E* the "foil". There can be no mileage in pursuing a distinction regarding the chanciness of the fact, along the lines, say, that whereas it is the strong chanciness of the fact that precludes an answer to a contrastive why-question, it is weak chanciness that pervades the macro realm. All-Pervasiveness of Chance just is the doctrine that macro events are susceptible to this most virulent kind of chanciness, and I have defended it with respect to those positive events which are the typical facts of macro contrastive explanations. Rather, we do better to look for a pertinent distinction among the foils of contrastive why-questions. In asserting that such questions have no answers if their facts are strongly chancy, Lewis makes no distinction among the foils with which a chancy fact might be contrasted. This is an oversight.
Lipton himself emphasises one important distinction among foils: some are compatible with their facts (as in "Why did Jones rather than Smith get paresis?") while others are incompatible with them (as in "Why did Jones throw his beer away instead of drinking it?"). But this distinction won't further Lewis's cause either. Were his prohibition on answers to contrastive why-questions concerning chance events confined to questions of just one of these kinds, some of the macro-explanations we hold dear would still be undermined, since these explanations answer questions of both kinds (see §3.2 above). Prima facie, however, a second distinction among foils will do nicely. In a contrastive why-question concerning a chancy fact, the foil might lie anywhere along a spectrum ranging from conceptual impossibility to strong chanciness, and the kind of answer that might be given is sensitive to where the foil lies. Consider the question "Why did the time-pressed sightseer recross bridges instead of taking a route that took him over each of Königsberg's bridges just once?". Ignoring the fact and focusing on the foil, a perfectly good answer observes the mathematical impossibility of such a route. Or consider a foil that is physically impossible. If someone wonders why this same sightseer didn't save time by instead taking flight and obtaining a quick aerial view of all the bridges, they can be answered by pointing out that it is physically impossible for a human being to take flight. The case is no different if the foil is physically possible but determined not to occur. Indeed, except when the foil is strongly chancy, an answer to the question "Why did E occur rather than E*?" regarding a strongly chancy fact might comply with Hempel's deductive-nomological model: neither the strong chanciness of the fact nor the nearly strong chanciness of the foil precludes the existence prior to the occurrence of the fact of states affairs which are nomologically sufficient for the non-occurrence of the foil.
An answer to a constrastive why-question which focuses on the question's foil in the above manner can be satisfactory, and whether it is so is independent of the status of the question's fact: in particular, it is independent of whether or not the fact is strongly chancy. Here then is an opportunity for Lewis to amend his solution so as to try to meet my objection. Among contrastive why-questions concerning strongly chancy facts, some having foils that are not strongly chancy clearly have answers. So as to respect this truth, Lewis's ban on contrastive explanations of strongly chancy events must be weakened to the doctrine that contrastive whyquestions lack answers if both fact and foil are strongly chancy. Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation must be restricted to:
Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation
We are right to explain chance events, yet we are right also to deny that we can ever explain why a chance process yields one outcome rather than another [that had a strong chance of happening instead] … we are right to call chance events inexplicable, if it is contrastive explanation [in which the foil is strongly chancy too] that we have in mind … [Such] a contrastive why-question … can have no positive answer … But take away the "rather" [or take away the strong chanciness of the foil] … and explanation becomes possible.
While this amendment is forced on independent grounds, the prospects of its being consistent with our contrastive explanatory practice regarding macro events under All-Pervasiveness of Chance seem good. Prima facie, that practice does not involve why-questions in which both fact and foil are strongly chancy. §2.2's discussion revealed that All-Pervasiveness of Chance embraces (most) positive actual events while stopping short at positive non-actual events (correlatively, at negative actual events). So those common cases in which we explain why some actual positive macro event occurred instead of some non-actual positive event are cases in which the fact is strongly chancy but the foil is not. Of course, one foil that a strongly chancy fact guarantees to be strongly chancy is the fact's contradictory. But we have little use for contrastive why-questions in which fact and foil contradict one another. Contrastive why-questions mostly concern positive actual events, and those in which the fact is contrasted with the negative non-actual event which contradicts it are rarely asked. My companion would have been surprised and somewhat perplexed if at the end of that great match I had asked "Why did England win the World Cup in 1966 instead of not winning it in 1966?". 9 Of course, that we don't ask such questions explicitly is consistent with them being asked implicitly. But there are two reasons why Lewis needn't be too bothered by this consideration. In emphasising the distinction between plain and contrastive why-questions, he has already rejected the view that all grammatically plain why-9 Contrastive why-questions in which a negative actual event (the fact) is explicitly contrasted with the positive non-actual event (the foil) which contradicts it are so rare that care is needed to frame them. If the phrase to the left of "instead of" does not include a negation sign, that phrase describes the (positive) fact and the phrase to the right describes the foil, both when the foil is positive, as in "Why did the car stop instead of turning left?" and when the foil is negative, as in "Why did she tell those stories instead of not saying anything?". But it is at best unnatural to apply this "fact-to-the-left" rule so as to contrast a negative fact with the positive foil which contradicts it. The rule suggests this contrast might be fashioned by replacing the contrary positive fact (the car stopping) in "Why did the car stop instead of turning left?" with the contradictory negative fact (the car not turning left). But the most natural way of doing this generates nonsense-namely, "Why didn't the car turn left instead of turning left?"-since this use of the negation sign serves not to characterise the fact but to signal a reversal of the positions questions are implicitly contrastive. 10 In any case, the supposition that the context of an apparently plain question induces an implicit foil is most plausible when the foil in question is some positive non-actual event.
One might also worry that the examples just given of clear-cut answers to contrastive why-questions whose facts might be strongly chancy amount to explanations of why the foil didn't occur instead of the fact, whereas we customarily explain why macro events did occur instead of their foils. But this worry stems from a spurious distinction. We say that Jones won the race instead of Smith because Jones trained hard (focus on fact), while saying too that Smith didn't win the race instead of Jones because Smith didn't train hard (focus on foil). But these are not genuine alternatives: each explanation only works because (conversationally at least) each implies the other. Accordingly, there seems every prospect that even under All-Pervasiveness of Chance, the contrastive explanations of macro events we hold dear are not among the contrastive explanations which Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation precludes.
A bonus
In holding that chance events have plain explanations while denying that they have contrastive explanations, Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation requires a deep distinction between plain and contrastive why-questions which is rejected by accounts which assimilate the two surface forms. The contrastive theory of plain why-questions inflates the plain form to the contrastive one: when the plain grammatical form is used, a contrastive why-question is nevertheless asked because the linguistic function of this form is such that an implicit contrast must be lurking in the background, of the fact and foil across the phrase "instead of". For example, in the question "Why didn't the car turn left instead of stopping?" it is the phrase to the right which characterises the fact, while the foil is characterised on the left and remains positive. So, if we want to contrast a positive contradictory foil with a negative fact when using the "Why didn't … instead of -?" construction, we have to employ a double negative, as in "Why didn't the car turn left instead of not turning left?". Indeed, in my idiolect this is the only natural way to express the contrast. If the negation sign is used a little differently, as in "Why did the car not turn left instead of turning left?", the question can be read as sticking to the fact-to-the-left rule whereby a negative actual fact is contrasted with a positive non-actual foil. But this reading requires practice. As in the first case, the most natural reading of a question "Why is the car not turning left instead of G-ing?" has positive fact on the right, positive foil on the left. On its most natural reading, the question "Why did the car not turn left instead of turning left?" is nonsensical.
10 See §4.3 below for a discussion of the impact of this view on Lewis's solution.
determined by contextual factors (van Fraassen 1980, Ch. 5). The conjunctive theory of contrastive why-questions reduces the contrastive form to the plain one: a question "Why did E occur rather than E*?" asks "Why did E and ¬E* occur?" (Temple 1988 ). Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation cannot survive either account. The first account has the consequence that an answer to a plain question "Why E?" is a contrastive explanation, since it holds that a contrastive why-question has really been asked. The second account has this consequence too. "E occurs" is equivalent to "E occurs and ¬(¬E occurs)". But the conjunctive view holds that the latter is the content of the question "Why did E occur rather than ¬E?". Hence, it holds that (the content of) the question "Why did E occur?" is logically equivalent to (the content of) a contrastive why-question. Since the conjunction of an explanation of E and an explanation of E* is an explanation of E and E*, Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation is also ruled out by the conjunctive view.
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Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation has the advantage here. Admittedly, it cannot accommodate the conjunctive theory of why-questions either. The contrastive why-question "Why did E occur rather than ¬E?" has a strongly chancy foil if it has a strongly fact. Hence, if E is strongly chancy and the conjunctive theory is correct, the plain "arm" of Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation says the question "Why E?" has an answer, while its contrastive arm says this question lacks one. However, in permitting some contrastive explanations of strongly chancy events, Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation can accommodate the contrastive theory of why-questions provided the (grammatically) plain why-questions concerning strongly chancy facts it deems answerable only imply foils which are not strongly chancy.
Modification or articulation?
I suspect that this modification and refinement of Lewis's solution accords quite well with his intentions, if not with his text. Though Lewis (1986d, pp. 230-1) says explicitly that "we are right to call chance events inexplicable, if it is contrastive explanation that we have in mind", I think that the foils that are his main concern are strongly chancy incompatible alternatives to their facts. Much of his discussion focuses in the abstract on events that are the outcomes of chancy processes, and it would be understandable if this led to a preoccupation with contrastive explanation in which a strongly chancy actual outcome is contrasted with an incompatible strongly chancy non-actual outcome.
12 Moreover, we will soon see ( §5.3) that the argument he gives for the doctrine that there are no contrastive explanations of chance events works best if the doctrine is restricted in the way I have recommended. Finally, supposing that it is Restricted Asymmetry, not Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation, that is uppermost in his mind explains how he could have explained why he visited Melbourne in 1979 rather than Oxford in the very same paper in which he argues both that chance is all-pervasive and that contrastive explanation of chance events is impossible. His visit to Melbourne was certainly strongly chancy: in all the last moments before his visit some chance remained of his constituent unstable atoms decaying explosively so as to prevent it. But the non-actual event of his visiting Oxford in 1979 was not strongly chancy: in the final moments of 1979, it was no longer physically possible. 
The need for a non-Lewisian solution
While the prospects of Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation meeting my objection to Lewis's original solution seemed good, an alternative solution is nevertheless called for. In the final analysis, this doctrine cannot quite meet my objection ( §5.1). Moreover, it is just wrong: some contrastive why-questions in which both fact and foil are strongly chancy do have answers ( §5.2-3).
Macro explanatory practice involving strongly chancy facts and foils
I have argued that among macro events, positive actual events (and hence the correlative negative non-actual events) are mostly strongly chancy, but that positive non-actual events (and hence the correlative negative actual events) are mostly not (see §2.2 above). In the main, then, if both fact and foil of a contrastive why-question regarding macro events are to be strongly chancy, the actual fact must be positive and the non-actual foil negative. §4.2's optimism regarding the consistency of Restricted Asym- 12 Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation certainly appears uppermost in Lewis's mind when, endorsing his earlier view, he writes that "there can be no contrastive causal explanation of why a chance event occurs rather than not" (1986a, p. 177, my emphasis).
13 Christopher Hitchcock offers an alternative explanation of Lewis's use of this example-namely, that Lewis deems his visit to Melbourne in 1979 deterministic. But this explanation cannot be squared with Lewis's advocacy of All-Pervasiveness of Chance. (In a recent personal communication, Lewis confirms that he maintained, and still maintains, that his visit to Melbourne was chancy in the relevant sense.) metry of Chancy Explanation with our contrastive explanatory practice under All-Pervasiveness of Chance rested in part on the observation that a positive fact is rarely contrasted with a negative foil that is its contradictory. But such optimism ignored a second possibility: contrasting a positive fact with a negative foil that is its contrary. Contrasts of this kind are not so rare. We ask not merely "Why did Jones go to the cinema instead of the theatre?" but "Why did Jones go to the cinema instead of not going out?", "Why did Jones raise his fists instead of not reacting?", "Why did Jones order sea bass instead of not ordering anything?" etc. Moreover, we do answer such questions: respectively, Jones found the house claustrophobic; he had had enough; and he was too embarrassed to mention his nausea etc. Yet in each case, both fact and foil are strongly chancy. In all the last moments before his actions, Jones's luck might have run out, spontaneous explosive decay of the unstable nuclei of which he is partly composed taken place, and the negative foils-his not going out, his not reacting, his not ordering anything-occurred instead. Hence, Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation says our practice is mistaken; the questions under consideration have no answers. This undermines much of the good work the doctrine put in so as to preserve our explanations of why Jones went to the cinema instead of the theatre etc. Admittedly, since questions involving contrary negative foils are less common than questions involving incompatible positive foils, it is only a fragment of our contrastive explanatory practice that is undermined. But a solution to Lewis's dilemma which leaves this practice intact in its entirety is preferable.
Counterexamples to Asymmetry and Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation
Even if Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation could be sustained, then, the solution it offers to Lewis's dilemma would be less than satisfactory. But it cannot be sustained. Certain examples suggest that some contrastive why-questions involving strongly chancy facts and foils have answers after all.
Suppose an indeterministic randomiser is connected to two doors A and B in such a way that when a button is pressed one door opens. Each door has some chance of opening, the chance depending on the randomiser's setting. Each year someone is selected for the task of pressing the button, the requirement being that they must pass through whichever door opens. It is common knowledge that the randomiser-carefully guarded-is set in such a way that there is a very tiny chance of door B opening, and in living memory no one has ever had to pass through that door. It is also rumoured that the fate of anyone who passes through door B is terrible. It is Jones's turn. The button is pressed and door B opens. At first Jones is dumbstruck. Then he thinks with consternation "Why did door B open instead of door A?". Had his fate been less unfortunate, he could have lived to answer the question: for his rival Smith had evaded security and altered the setting of the randomiser so as to reverse the two doors' chances of opening.
This example is only suggestive. Indeed, it isn't quite to the point, since it has not been constructed in such a way so as to ensure that each door has a strong chance of opening: once the randomiser has done its job, that door A does not open might well be determined. However, the case is instructive because while Smith's action seems to provide the answer to Jones's question, that it does so appears independent of whether or not the chanciness of the two events-door B opening, door A opening-is strong. Prima facie, Smith's action explains why door B opened instead of door A simply in virtue of its dramatic reversal of the chances of the two events occurring.
It is easy enough to illustrate this moral when fact and foil are both strongly chancy. Suppose Jones has prepared a stream of vertically polarised photons and directed them at a polariser he had tilted previously just above the horizontal so as to provide, for each photon, a very small chance of transmission (rather than absorption). Much to his amazement, all the photons are transmitted. Were we naturally Lewisian about such matters, we would nevertheless expect Jones not to question this occurrence and to get on with his work. But we do not expect this, and it doesn't happen. Although Jones knew that there was a chance of transmission on his set-up, his astonishment leads him to ask "Why were those photons transmitted through the polariser instead of being absorbed?". Nor does the strong chanciness of fact and foil preclude an answer. As before, Smith is the culprit. He had slipped into the lab unseen and altered the orientation of the polariser to fractionally off the vertical. Jones naturally asks the question. Smith's action naturally answers it. Contrastive explanation of why a strongly chancy fact occurred instead of some strongly chancy foil is possible after all.
Lewis's argument for the impossibility of chancy contrastive explanation
Such examples suggest the erroneousness of Restricted Asymmetry and Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation's common claim that explanation of strongly chancy facts with respect to strongly chancy incompatible foils is impossible. But Lewis develops an independent argument for the claim that contrastive explanation of chance events is impossible, and were it strong our intuitions might have to be revised. It has two premises. The first relates a requirement on an answer to a contrastive why-question:
The Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement
A contrastive why-question with "rather" requests information about the features that differentiate the actual causal history [i.e. of an actual event] from its counterfactual alternative [i.e. the causal history of the contrasting event]. (Lewis 1986d, p. 231) The second premise asserts the impossibility of meeting this requirement in the case of chance events:
Same Chancy Counterfactual Causal History
The actual causal history of the actual chance outcome does not differ at all from the unactualized causal history that the other outcome would have had, if that outcome had happened. (Lewis 1986d, p. 231) What is to be made of Lewis's argument when its premises and conclusion are restricted to incompatible strongly chancy facts and foils?
14 Naturally enough, Lewis does not deny the possibility of constrastively explaining deterministic events. So he is committed to thinking that the Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement can be satisfied in the deterministic case. But this commitment renders the interpretation of the argument problematic. If this requirement is to be met in the deterministic case, the causal history of an actual deterministic outcome must differ from the unactualised causal history that the other outcome would have had if it had happened. But this is to say that if the deterministic foil had occurred instead of the deterministic fact something apparently prior to the foil's occurrence-its causal history-would have been different. Yet Lewis (1979) insists that (what he takes to be) the standard resolution of (what he takes to be) the vagueness of the counterfactual conditional precludes true "backtracking" counterfactuals, that is, counterfactuals whose consequents concern events which occur earlier than the events with which their antecedents are concerned. The resulting tension can be resolved in two ways, depending on how the Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement is construed. Firstly, the requirement can be taken to involve (what Lewis takes to be) a non-standard resolution of the vagueness of counterfactuals which permits backtracking. On this reading, the requirement holds that an event C answers a question "Why E rather than E*?" iff C caused E and for E* to have occurred, C would have had not to have occurred. Secondly, the requirement can be taken to involve (what Lewis takes to be) the standard resolution of the vagueness of counterfactuals, with Lewis's prohibition on standardly-resolved backtrackers being taken to concern only the counterfactual history of an event, not its counterfactual causal history. On this second reading, Lewis holds that while, on the standard resolution of counterfactuals, the counterfactual history of each non-actual event would have been the same in the sense that For all non-actual events E*, there is no actual event C occurring prior to a time at which E* might have occurred such that, if E* had occurred C wouldn't have, it can happen that the counterfactual causal histories of non-chancy nonactual events E* would have been different in that For some such E* there is a prior actual event C such that (i) C caused an event E which E* would have occurred instead of, and (ii) if E* had occurred it would not have been caused by C.
Either alternative saves Lewis from inconsistency. However, on neither of them can his argument be sustained. If the argument is to go through, at least one of these alternative readings must be extended, mutatis mutandis, to Same Chancy Counterfactual History. But this premise fails under both readings. Lewis (1979, pp. 33-4) allows that under a non-standard resolution of the vagueness of the counterfactual conditional, such claims as "If (proud) Smith had asked Jones for a favour today there would have (had to have) been no quarrel yesterday" can come out true. But this backtracker is no better off than a counterfactual like "For all those photons to have been absorbed, Smith would have had not to have adjusted the polariser-setting in the way that he did". 15 Hence, Same Chancy Counterfactual Causal History fails on the first reading. Alternatively, even if the standardly-resolved counterfactual history of a strongly chancy foil would have been the same as the actual history of a strongly chancy fact, I don't see that its causal history would have been. Like Lewis, I think that indeterministic events can have causes: there is no contradiction in the supposition that although the transmission of the photons remained chancy after Smith's intervention, that intervention caused the photons to be transmitted. But it is implausible-and especially so on Lewis's view of causation under indeterminism-to suppose that if the extremely improbable had occurred and some of the photons been absorbed despite Smith's intervention, Smith's action would have caused them to have been absorbed. Hence, Same Chancy Counterfactual Causal History also fails on the second reading.
I think Lewis is wrong to deny that the Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement can be met in the case of why-questions involving incompatible but strongly chancy facts and foils. But even if I am mistaken, the requirement is too suspect to overturn the intuition that such questions can be answered in the sort of case considered in the previous sub-section. For this requirement clearly fails on both readings with respect to contrastive why-questions whose fact and foil are compatible. On the first reading, it is too severe: for example, it is not the case that for Smith, who doesn't have untreated syphilis or paresis, to have developed paresis, Jones would have had not have had untreated syphilis, even though Jones's untreated syphilis explains why he rather than Smith developed paresis. On the second reading, it is too weak: for example, it is the case that if the untreated syphilitic Brown had developed paresis, Jones's untreated syphilis would not have been a cause of Brown's so doing, even though Jones's untreated syphilis does not explain why Jones rather than Brown developed paresis. This failure of the requirement in the case of questions whose fact and foil are compatible reduces the credibility of the supposition that it holds for questions whose fact and foil of are incompatible and strongly chancy.
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16 Lipton (1990, p. 255; 1993, p. 42 ) also argues that the Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement fails for why-questions whose fact and foil are compatible. However, he does not distinguish the alternative interpretations of it I have distinguished, and his argument appears to presuppose the second interpretation. When I first read Lewis I did not conceive this interpretation, and I took the first interpretation for granted. Christopher Hitchcock explained the distinction between the two interpretations to me and persuaded me to relinquish the first in favour of the second. Though I learnt a lot from that discussion, I ought not to have switched my allegiance: Lewis has since confirmed that my initial reading was correct after all (personal communication). I have nevertheless discussed Lewis's argument under the second interpretation for two reasons. Firstly, it yields a doctrine that is important in its own right. Secondly, the first and apparently intended reading of Lewis's argument encounters the following difficulty. Under this interpretation, the Different Counterfactual Causal History Requirement combines with Lewis's views of counterfactual dependence and causation to yield the consequence that when we ask "Why E rather than E*?" both standard and non-standard resolutions of the vagueness of counterfactuals have to be employed-the former to determine the causes of E, the latter to determine whether any cause of E explains why E rather than E*. Hence, Lewis's views have the incredible consequence that beings possessed of the concept of counterfactual dependence (and hence of causation) under what he takes to be the standard resolution of the vagueness of counterfactuals, but not under the non-standard resolution of it, are able to answer "Why did E occur?", but unable even to ask "Why did E occur instead of E*?".
The resolution of Lewis's dilemma
Essences of chance?
I have argued that neither Asymmetry nor Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation satisfactorily resolves the Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism: an alternative solution permitting contrastive explanations in which both fact and incompatible foil are strongly chancy is required. Once the falsity of even Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation is recognised, the attraction of the dilemma's first horn can be grounded in part in the truth that our contrastive explanatory practice with respect to macro events is not fundamentally misguided. But it is in the nature of dilemmas that the more that is conceded to one horn, the more the difficulties posed by the other horn become pressing. In according the first horn so much respect, we must ensure that we have not fallen foul of the second:
Second horn-Chance events cannot be supposed explicable: that would require an unacceptable revision of our conception of the "essence of chance" whereby there is no reason why a chance event happens rather than some other. Given Lewis's distinction between plain and contrastive explanations, this horn has two readings. According to his proposed solution, this horn is incorrect on the plain reading, but correct on the contrastive reading: a chance event can be supposed to have a plain explanation since this wouldn't be to deny that there is no reason why a chance event occurs rather than another which might have occurred instead; but it cannot be supposed to have a contrastive explanation since this would be to deny as much.
This response has been read off from Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation. Lewis offers no guidance, but it is reasonable to suppose that it is governed by his acceptance of:
Essence of Chance [A chance event] happens rather than another for no reason. (Lewis, 1986d p. 230) 17 In effect, his rejection of contrastive explanations of chance events is an expression of the sense in which he takes Essence of Chance to be true. Since his dilemma has bite, a satisfactory solution should account for the 17 Lewis (1986d) argues that each explanation of an event (plain or contrastive) provides information about the event's causal history. Hence, in stating the "essence of chance" in terms of "reason", he presupposes the theses that all reasons explain and that all reasons are causes. At least in the philosophy of mind, these theses are controversial. I cannot go into this matter here and I follow Lewis.
(Mark Sainsbury pointed out this issue.) appeal of Essence of Chance. Lewis's solution-Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation-accounts for it by accepting Essence of Chance as true. Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation can do the same. To be sure, it cannot do so if Essence of Chance is taken to entail that no contrastive why-question involving a fact that is (strongly) chancy has an answer. But it doesn't have to be taken this way, and it is equally reasonable to construe it as holding that there is no reason why a chance event happens rather than another incompatible event which always had some chance of happening instead. In effect, this simply restricts the implicit quantification in Essence of Chance. Importing my reading of "chance event" as "strongly chancy event", on the former construal the doctrine says
Strong Essence of Chance
For all strongly chancy E, for all non-actual E* there is no reason why E occurs rather than E*. On the latter, it says
Weak Essence of Chance
For all strongly chancy E and all non-actual E* which are incompatible with E and which had a strong chance of happening instead, there is no reason why E occurred rather than E*.
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Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation can accommodate Weak but not Strong Essence of Chance. However, although Weak Essence of Chance is an equally good explanation of the appeal of Essence of Chance, we have seen that it too is untenable.
The problem, then, is to explain the appeal of Essence of Chance by some alternative means. The move from Asymmetry to Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation relies on a distinction between two kinds of contrastive why-question. I suspect the appeal of Weak Essence of Chance stems from a distinction between kinds of answer to such questions. That is, I suspect its appeal stems from the appeal of
Weaker Essence of Chance
For all strongly chancy E and strongly chancy incompatible events E*, there is no reason of a certain kind why E occurred rather than E*.
I think Weaker Essence of Chance derives its appeal at least in part from the appeal of two groundings, one trivial and true, the other nontrivial but false. It is trivially true, since there can be no determining reason why a strongly chancy fact occurred rather than a strongly chancy foil. 19 And it can seem non-trivially true on the grounds that there can be nothing immediately beforehand that explains why a strongly chancy fact occurred instead of some strongly chancy incompatible foil. But this is an illusion. For strongly chancy E and E*, an event such as Jones's intervention (see §5.2 above), which explains why E rather than E* by dramatically reversing the chances of E and E* can occur as close as one likes to the times at which E occurs.
Alternative theories of contrastive explanation
A comprehensive version of the alternative resolution of Lewis's dilemma I recommend would defend and elaborate not only a theory of (grammatically) plain explanations of chance events (as Lewis does), but a theory of contrastive explanations involving strongly chancy facts and foils too (as of course Lewis does not). Since Lewis denies the possibility of a satisfactory theory of the latter kind, it is this second task which is most pressing.
There are many theories of contrastive explanation which permit contrastive explanation of strongly chancy facts with respect to strongly chancy incompatible foils, and, hence, readily accommodate the intuitions to which I have appealed. One of them, Philip Kitcher's, has already been mentioned (see footnote 9, above). However, I dislike the feature it shares with Cartwright's (1983) "simulacrum" model of explanationnamely, that whether an event is explicable depends not on features of the relevant processes themselves, but on features of whatever models of those processes we find useful or convenient. To my mind, such "simulacrum" models of explanation are merely models of simulacrum explanation: an explanation cannot be correct if it is based on falsehoods that happen to be convenient. Whatever the convenience of applying a deterministic model to an indeterministic process, no derivation of the occurrence of E and non-occurrence of E* in a deterministic model can explain why E occurred rather than E* if E and E* are not in fact governed by deterministic laws.
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19 While some people might find the inference from this triviality to Weak Essence of Chance attractive, it cannot be supposed that its allure explains why anyone relevantly like-minded to Lewis espouses Essence of Chance. In insisting that strongly chancy events have plain explanations, they have committed themselves to reasons which are not determining, and hence ruled the inference out. 20 Glymour's (1998) model of the contrastive explanation of chance events also downplays their indeterministic nature, since his model tries to reconcile the idea that causes determine their effects with the idea that chance events have causes. Indeed, appealing to Salmon's variant (1984) of the Lewisian argument rejected above ( §5.3), Glymour argues from the need to preserve our contrastive explanatory practice to a conception of causation which incorporates this reconciliation.
Fortunately, other models of explanation permitting contrastive explanation involving strongly chancy facts and foils accord truth-and hence indeterminism-more respect. I have in mind the probabilistic models developed in van Fraassen (1980, pp. 146-51) , Sober (1986), and Hitchcock (1996) . The one obvious, albeit weak, moral of the examples in §4.2 and §5.2 above is that a sufficient condition of C explaining why E rather than E* is that it should in a certain sense strongly favour E above E*.
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Plausibly, this notion of "strongly favouring" can be articulated in probabilistic terms, and the models just mentioned do indeed accommodate this moral in their various ways. I do not say that any of them is correct. But be this as it may, I hope I have justified my confidence that, pace Lewis, whichever model is correct likewise permits answers to why-questions whose facts and foils are strongly chancy.
Conclusion
I agree with Lewis that indeterminism pervades the macro-realm so as to generate the Dilemma of Explanation under Indeterminism. But I have shown that his attempted solution of this dilemma, Asymmetry of Chancy In attempting this reconciliation, Glymour suggests that when a chance event E is caused by an event C, it is caused in so far as the occurrence of C determined it to occur, and it is chancy in so far as the occurrence of C left some chance that C would not cause E. Clearly, from this viewpoint, explaining why a chance event E occurred rather than some incompatible chancy alternative E* is easy: E occurred instead of E* because C occurred, and although there was only a chance that C would cause E, C did cause it, and thereby determined E to occur instead of E*. However, I doubt that this model yields contrastive explanations of strongly chancy events. Glymour does not draw the distinction between strong and weak chance, and the supposition that an event E might be strongly chancy and yet some other event C be a determining cause of it is unattractive. (Certainly, if C occurs at times earlier than times at which E occurs, the supposition is contradictory.) 21 The examples of §4.2 above suggest that C explains why E rather than E* if it reveals E* to be in a sense impossible. The examples in §5.2 above suggest that C explains why E rather than E* if it amounts to an event C such that (i) prior to the occurrence of C, the chance of E* was close to 1 and the chance of E was close to zero; (ii) the occurrence of C raised the chance of E to close to 1 and lowered the chance of E* to close to zero, in the sense that these were the chances of E and E* respectively after C occurred, and if C hadn't occurred these chances would have remained as in (i); (iii) nothing occurred after C and prior to E so as to lower the chances of E or to raise the chance of E*.
Explanation, fails. I have offered two alternative solutions. The first, Restricted Asymmetry of Chancy Explanation, is available to those such as Lewis, Salmon, and Railton who accept Lewis's argument for, or otherwise endorse, the claim that there can be no contrastive explanation of strongly chancy events with respect to incompatible strongly chancy foils. The second, non-Lewisian solution-the illusoriness of Essence of Chance-is available to those such as Sober and Hitchcock who maintain the possibility of such contrastive explanations. I have given as many reasons as space permits for my view that it is the second of these alternatives which is correct. Either way, the dilemma is resolved.
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